

1215

# DISPATCH

SECRET

## PROCESSING ACTION

TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, Santiago	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	[REDACTED]	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES		

1. The months from April to June 1970 witnessed a decline of Alessandri's popularity, accelerated by a TV appearance which made him appear physically and mentally ill-equipped to withstand the rigors of the Presidency in an era of turbulence. Several public opinion polls bore out this conclusion, especially in the Greater Santiago area where Alessandri's appeal dropped below 40%. A poll taken in Greater Santiago in late June, however, appeared to indicate that Alessandri had "bottomed out" and had begun a recovery, although still not reaching the 40% level which some students of the political scene consider crucial. What seems to have happened is that once the mystique of Alessandri's name and personality had begun to wear off, deficiencies in the management of his campaign and the deliberate failure to articulate a government program began to appear in more striking relief.

2. We shall not attempt to speculate here what has happened to Alessandri's defecting votes, but we doubt that any appreciable number shifted over to Tomic; who, as of this writing, had not reached the percentage level of his party in the congressional elections of March 1969. At least in Greater Santiago, therefore, as the Chilean elections enter the final stretch, the race is between Alessandri and Allende. The latter's voter appeal since he was nominated in January 1969 has registered uninterrupted though unspectacular growth.

3. This combination of circumstances prompted the Embassy on 18 June, to ask for an expanded mandate to contain that growth, on the theory that a photo finish between Alessandri and Allende on 4 September might induce a sufficient number of leftwing Christian Democrats in Congress to cast their vote for Allende. Exactly what the percentage gap between the first two contenders

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		[REDACTED]	30 June 1970
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need to be in order to persuade the houses of Congress to heed the highest relative majority achieved in the elections is a moot point. Suffice it to say that a very narrow gap could bode ill for Alessandri, even if he should win the first majority on 4 September.

4. The prospect of Alessandri's defeat in Congress could be viewed with equanimity as long as Tomic stood a reasonable chance of overtaking Allende. While we cannot rule this out, the present portents are discouraging enough to counsel against predicating our strategy on the assumption that this is likely to come to pass.

Least of all do we share the hope that, at the decisive moment, President Frei will muster qualities of political leadership and daring required to persuade the left wing of his party to cast its vote for Alessandri. To entertain that hope would be tantamount to blandly ignoring the record of the last six years which, if anything, leaves no trace of such daring during times of national crisis and furthermore testifies to an unbridgeable gulf between the Chilean Right and the Christian Democrat movement.

5. Unless, therefore, we succeed in our endeavor to weaken the leftist alliance sufficiently to allow Tomic to move into second place or to contribute measurably to a wide percentage gap between Alessandri and Allende, the battle could be lost decisively on 4 September with no realistic hope of retrieval in the second, congressional, round. What we are able to accomplish between now and 4 September is bound to carry appreciably more weight than any post-mortem ministrations after that date.

6. During the month of June, evidence began to mount that the leftist alliance and its standardbearer Allende at long last felt the full impact of our campaign. They analyzed it correctly as designed to split the left and to polarize the Chilean electorate between marxists and non-marxists. They gave us high marks for making strides in both respects, obviously without conceding the possibility of a defeat at the polls. A wave of violence gave the lie to their protestations of innocence and gratuitously contributed chapter and verse to the leitmotif of our campaign. By hammering away at the theme of "violence from the left" we were able to neutralize a sizable portion of the electoral effort of the Left spent in self-defense and excoriation of the masterminds behind that "insidious" campaign.

7. One of the more ironical aspects of this whole episode is the fact that neither Alessandri nor Tomic are seeking a confrontation with the Left. Both believe in their ability to ride the tiger and achieve victory on their vaunted charisma. Both fear that such a confrontation will ultimately debouch into violence on a major scale and bloodshed. A concomittant fallacy is the conviction shared by both candidates that circumstances will force the Chilean left to support their administration. To varying degrees they put reliance on a policy of appeasement.

8. Our campaign, therefore, strikes a discordant note in a concert of sweetness and light which the PCCh treats with the disdain it merits. The Station continues to deal with this rather abnormal situation through a variety of stratagems inveigling Christian Democrats and Nationals

Alessandri's campaign command has

[REDACTED] been put on notice that their campaign strategy of ignoring the threat from the Left is self-defeating. They are currently engaged in a re-appraisal of that strategy, with [REDACTED] advocating a no-holds-barred campaign against the "Unidad Popular." Once Alessandri and his advisors feel sufficiently reassured that Tomic no longer stands a realistic chance to move into second position, they may become more disposed to step into the fray. In the meanwhile, Alessandrista disavowals of a leading role in the "campaign of fear" carry scant conviction and gain them no political mileage.

9. [REDACTED]

10. Through [REDACTED] the Station [REDACTED] which the National Party is allowed to draw to finance anti-Unidad Popular propaganda as long as it does not solicit votes for Alessandri.

11. [REDACTED]

12. [REDACTED]

13. Any estimate of the relative significance of private contributions is necessarily a tentative one. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We view with some apprehension the security leaks it is likely to bring in its wake which could easily be laid at our doorsteps. The espousal of [REDACTED] groundrules as also governing the use to which private contributions are to be put, has not escaped the attention of communist commentators who adduce it in evidence [REDACTED] collusion.

14. While we cannot gainsay [REDACTED] observation that the Station's program and its financing [REDACTED] may serve to release private contributions for application to the outright support of Alessandri's campaign, this should not lead to the conclusion that Station and business community are in some kind of silent partnership and that our respective contributions are fungible. Our system

of funding [REDACTED] specific action operations has been refined to a point where fiscal controls and end use checks have reached a state of near-perfection, thanks to the unstinting cooperation [REDACTED].

15. Conversely, [REDACTED] is right in pointing out that the [REDACTED] program in some of its most salient aspects is a result of Station planning and inspiration and that consequently many of our ideas, for which we can hardly claim copyright, may ultimately be funded from private contribution. Where we have to part ways, is in accepting the corollary that our role [REDACTED] brain trust entitles us to the exercise of some kind of a veto right over [REDACTED] propaganda activities. We neither claim nor exercise it.

[REDACTED]  
For reasons difficult to fathom it did not conform to [REDACTED] bizarre ideas about hard-hitting propaganda, best illustrated by his suggestion that we ring the changes on the theme "the Yanks are leaving."

16. The Station has provided Headquarters with an increasing number of sensitivity indicators, lavishly supplied by spokesmen and media of the "Unidad Popular." We realize that they fall short of conclusive proof that, as a result of our campaign, Allende has been losing or denied votes. It may turn out that, in the final analysis, all we did was to render a marginal contribution to the mounting polarization of the Chilean electorate between left and right. If this be the case and if, on 4 September, Allende should emerge third, he and his followers will undoubtedly cry "foul" and the violence-prone elements of the alliance will invoke the defeat as vindication of the use of force.

17. It is argued that "Unidad Popular," having already concluded that victory is beyond its grasp, is focussing on the "campaign of fear" as a convenient alibi to offer its disappointed followers.

18. Tomic and his campaign command have gone on record as deprecating the "campaign of fear." From time to time rumors crop up that a change of Tomicista strategy is in the offing and that endurance with communist vituperations has reached its limits. We wait to see practical manifestations of that change of heart before believing it. Also, we may be forgiven for doubting the sincerity of Frei's avowals of chagrin over Tomic's blindness in not perceiving the true nature of the communist threat. Neither is ready to change his spots. Tomic only has to blame himself for his inability to break out of the ideological straight jacket into which his party has clamped him. His ill-concealed condonement of violence, his espousal of the Medellin doctrine of "institutionalized violence" as the breeder of violence of the masses, reduced him to the pitiful role of a communist camp follower. [REDACTED] forced Tomic to take a stand on violence and that he has been found wanting. He may therefore justly feel aggrieved at having been forced into a corner. This, of course, is not one of the objectives of [REDACTED] and describes a dilemma entirely of Tomic's own making.

19. The Radical Party has also taken a licking. The growing disenchantment of its leadership with "Unidad Popular" policies and practices revolves around the issue of violence. As a result of all this, radical leaders, nominally belonging to "Unidad Popular" alliance, see their following de-camping in droves and are beginning to question their own judgment in having joined in the first instance.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION <del>SECRET</del>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER [REDACTED]
<p>We shall see how far this disintegration of "Unidad Popular" can be pushed as long as Alessandri's victory at the polls remains in doubt.</p> <p>20. The Station cannot claim credit for having created the issue of "violence." It rests on hard facts and on demonstrable events; but the ambient of controversy in which it has become enveloped is essentially our doing. To sweep it under the rug has now become impossible. It represents a national issue of transcendent importance. Communist protestations of pragmatic disapprobation of political violence are drowned out by the din of MIR explosives, the visual impact of more than one hundred thousand posters reminding the Chilean voter that a vote for Allende is a vote for violence, not to mention innumerable radio programs belaboring the same theme, and lastly by public statements of leaders of the socialist movement which now stands accused by the government as the progenitor and organizer of violence and terrorism.</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>21. Many of the facets of our program dealt with in this dispatch apply both to [REDACTED]. The latter avails itself of the facilities [REDACTED] placed at our disposal. [REDACTED] cooperation has been unstinting; a temporary crisis brought about by misconceptions over the scope of [REDACTED] involvement was successfully overcome.</p> <p>[REDACTED] rightly view [REDACTED] cooperation with the Station as an earnest [REDACTED] abiding concern over the future of Chile. [REDACTED] insights into the political imperatives that determine our policies in the Western Hemisphere are unequalled in Chile. [REDACTED] turn out a first class propaganda product at reasonable prices. [REDACTED] accounting procedures are impeccable.</p> <p>[REDACTED] We can obviously make no safe prediction of what the future has in store for [REDACTED] and for us. [REDACTED]</p> <p>22. At the time this progress report reaches completion, Chile may be on the threshold of violent upheaval or it may safely make port. Alessandri is very old and quite unpredictable. Chile, by the admission of some of its most astute observers, is entering uncharted waters. Terrorism, a restless officer corps, and the disintegrating authority of Church and University have added new dimensions to an already very complex situation. So has [REDACTED] disengagement and the inability of Chile's political leadership to grasp its long range implications. At the risk of sounding unduly pessimistic, it should be stated that the very thin thread of common destiny and longstanding special relationship between the two countries may snap at any moment and with very little advance warning.</p> <p>23. This dispatch should serve to apprise Headquarters of some of the problems encountered during the last three months in discharging our responsibilities under [REDACTED] mandate to keep the Chilean left divided and of some of the achievements for which we should like to take credit. [REDACTED]</p>		
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